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Highlights 
• We develop a framework for corporate communications in the event of a cyber 
incident 
• Best practices for effective data breach announcement decisions identified 
• The framework is grounded in a systematic review and real-world case studies 
• Interviews with senior industry professionals allow framework evaluation and 
refinement 
• The framework can complement security incident response and management in 
businesses 
 
Abstract  
A major cyber security incident can represent a cyber crisis for an organisation, in particular 
because of the associated risk of substantial reputational damage. As the likelihood of falling 
victim to a cyberattack has increased over time, so too has the need to understand exactly 
what is effective corporate communication after an attack, and how best to engage the 
concerns of customers, partners and other stakeholders. This research seeks to tackle this 
problem through a critical, multi-faceted investigation into the efficacy of crisis 
communication and public relations following a data breach. It does so by drawing on 
academic literature, obtained through a systematic literature review, and real-world case 
studies. Qualitative data analysis is used to interpret and structure the results, allowing for 
the development of a new, comprehensive framework for corporate communication to 
support companies in their preparation and response to such events. The validity of this 
framework is demonstrated by its evaluation through interviews with senior industry 
professionals, as well as a critical assessment against relevant practice and research. The 
framework is further refined based on these evaluations, and an updated version defined. 
This research represents the first grounded, comprehensive and evaluated proposal for 
characterising effective corporate communication after cyber security incidents.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On the morning of 23rd October 2015, the Chief Executive of TalkTalk, a major UK 
telecommunications provider, featured on BBC Radio Four’s Today Programme. The 
organisation had just discovered a data breach and subsequently wanted to inform its 
customers. During the radio interview, however, she had to admit to not knowing whether 
the data lost was encrypted (Khomami, 2015a). This apparent lack of knowledge resulted in 
criticism both in social (BBC Radio 4, 2015) and traditional media (Khomami, 2015b). Other 
public statements trying to compare the organisation’s cyber security capability favourably 
against competitors and the application of early termination fees to those customers wishing 
to leave were similarly admonished (Cluley, 2015). Days later, a UK House of Commons 
enquiry had been convened (BBC, 2015b) and the firm was subsequently fined £400,000 by 
the UK Information Commissioners Office (ICO) (ICO, 2016).   
       
Although the enquiry and ICO investigation found significant deficiencies in TalkTalk’s cyber 
security, the organisation’s approach to public communications has also drawn criticism 
(Maddocks, 2015) and is likely to have made the situation worse. Similar deficiencies in 
communication can also be witnessed more recently in other high-profile cases such as the 
Equifax breach in 2017, and the Travelex cyberattack in 2020. Whilst it is a key task of cyber 
security professionals to prevent such attacks, no system is totally secure, so it is important 
that if a breach occurs organisations respond appropriately. The way that businesses 
communicate to their customers and external stakeholders following a data breach can 
impact their share price and reputation to such an extent that they can be considered cyber 
crises (Wang and Park, 2017); these also have further implications for the business’ continuity 
and resilience. The approaches for communication following a cyber security incident have, 
therefore, become an important area of research and practice.  
 
In this paper, we seek to further academic research on the topic of appropriate corporate 
communication and public announcements after a cyber security incident. Through an 
investigation into related academic and practitioner work, we aim to improve the 
understanding of what constitutes effective and poor external communication following such 
incidents. In addition to providing this insight, a primary contribution of our research is the 
development, evaluation and refinement of a framework to support organisations in 
corporate communications after an incident. This framework can provide organisations with 
insight into the types of activities that are necessary after an incident (or cyber crisis), the key 
organisations and personnel with which to engage, and how they may consider crafting and 
disseminating public announcements and other correspondence. We note here that security 
incidents can be characterised by their malicious or unintentional nature; this study and the 
framework outlined consider malicious attacks and data breaches in particular given their 
prevalence and the resulting media interest (Berkman et al., 2018). In later sections, we also 
reflect on our findings and comment on the suitability of the framework to support breaches 
that are as a result of unintentional actions (e.g., accidental insider threats (Nurse et al., 
2014)). 
 
The approach to achieve our research aim is guided by a rigorous methodology which takes 
inputs from academic research and commentary on current data breach cases from cyber 
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security specialists. It is further informed by interviews with senior, and highly experienced, 
security and public relations professionals.   
 
In summary, the contributions of our work are as follows: 
• A critical investigation into effective and poor communication after cyber security 
incidents, according to academic literature and a series of real-world case studies 
(including commentary from well-respected, international security specialists). 
• The development, evaluation and refinement of a framework to enhance best practice 
regarding corporate communications and announcements in such situations. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we scope our research and 
review the background theory on data breach communications. The research methodology is 
outlined in Section 3.  We present the first stage of our work, a systematic, and critical review 
of current literature on the topic of data breach communications in Section 4. This is followed 
by an analysis of real-world cyber incident communications (and related commentary), drawn 
from several case studies in Section 5. Section 6 introduces our proposed framework to 
enhance incident response communication strategies in organisations, which is then 
evaluated and appropriately updated in Section 7. Finally, we conclude and present avenues 
for future work in Section 8. 
 
 
2. Background and Related Work 
2.1 Cyber Security Incidents and Communications Theory 
 
Security incidents can take various forms. They can encompass the accidental exposure or 
loss of data, ransomware attacks, or disruption of systems (Sarabi et al., 2016). Although data 
breaches can be seen as a subset, there is variation over their definition (Schatz and 
Bashroush, 2016; Edwards et al., 2016). For our research, we focus the term data breach on 
unlawful acts and use an amended version of the ISO description accordingly: “compromise 
of security that leads to the unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, 
or access to, protected data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed” (Adapted from: ISO, 
2015). As mentioned earlier, we scope our work at this point to malicious data breaches. 
 
Another fundamental term in our research is that of a crisis, or cyber crisis. The loss of a 
significant amount of personal or sensitive data can be extremely detrimental for 
organisations given its impact (Agrafiotis et al., 2018; Wang and Park, 2017). Whilst various 
definitions of a crisis have been put forward (Mitroff, 1988), the following appears to 
encapsulate their essence:  “A high consequence, low probability [event], overlaid with risk 
and uncertainty, conducted under time-pressure, disruptive of normal business and potentially 
lethally damaging to organizational reputation” (Gregory, 2005, p. 313). Although this 
description was developed through work in another domain, it can aptly be applied to 
describe the aftermath of a substantial data breach (which can also be linked to the size of 
the breach or the type of data lost). A cyber crisis can, therefore, be seen as a crisis resulting 
from a data breach or similar security event.  
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The field of public relations has considerable research on crisis communications; situational 
crisis communication theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 2007) and theory of image restoration (Benoit, 
1997) being the preeminent models in this area (Avery et al., 2010). They provide a framework 
for the types of response available to organisations during a crisis.  Whilst these concepts are 
well regarded, they have been criticised for not being practical, meaning they allow 
practitioners to understand the approach they are using but do not provide detailed criteria 
that would enable organisations to determine which approach to use (Avery et al., 2010). This 
is particularly true where data breaches are concerned, due to the ambiguity over whether 
the organisation is a victim as a result of being hacked or is responsible as a result of having 
inadequate security measures in place (Bentley et al., 2018).   
 
2.2 External Communication after a Data Breach 
 
Research into how businesses communicate during a cyber crisis has tended to take a top-
down approach. Kim et al. (2017) for example, apply a deductive method to investigate how 
newspapers interpret data breach corporate communication. This has the potential to 
constrain thinking, as analysis of crisis communication is framed by these models. For 
instance, some studies into data breach communication models have predetermined SCCT as 
the framework applied to case studies (Wang and Park, 2017; Wang and Johnson, 2018), 
which means that the data are examined through a fixed set of categories which may overlook 
other explanations for the results. Qualitative methods such as qualitative thematic analysis 
provide an alternative approach which allows patterns to be observed that may be obscured 
by a more constricted method (Kaefer et al., 2015; Strauss and Corbin, 1994).   
 
Much of the research carried out on data breaches is focused on companies based in the USA 
(Spanos and Angelis, 2016). In particular, the primary studies on data breach communications 
found during an initial literature review have used USA corporations as case studies (Wang 
and Johnson, 2018; Wang and Park, 2017). There is also notably work exploring the 
relationships between social media, stock prices and data breach announcements on USA 
companies (Rosati et al., 2019).  Although the USA has a substantial corporate base, this focus 
illustrates a gap in research. We posit that other countries, such as the UK for instance, could 
be another intriguing case for research given its position as a major world economy with 
extensive internet use amongst its population. In this paper therefore, we seek to provide 
another perspective on the problem of corporate communications after a data breach. In 
subsequent sections we provide a more critical review of existing literature and detail how 
we analyse it, and our own primary data to develop the new framework.  
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
The research presented in this article investigates a topical problem that has been explored 
and discussed in research and practice. As such, our methodology is grounded in insights from 
both of these domains, and based on those foundations and contributions, we arrive at our 
findings and framework. The methodology has four main steps, which are described below 
and depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Research methodology overview 
 
3.1 Systematic Review of Literature  
 
Existing academic literature is of great value in informing what response and activities 
companies should adopt after a data breach. As such, we first critically review literature in 
the field of crisis communication to understand best, and recommended, practices. For this 
review, we use the PRISMA framework due to its ability to provide rigor, consistency and 
transparency in the selection of relevant articles (Moher et al., 2009); PRISMA has also been 
used on several occasions in computer security research (Fernández-Alemán et al., 2013).  
 
In PRISMA, decisions are required on article sampling and filtering criteria. Considering that 
our research spans across the computer security and business fields, we scope the databases 
and articles sampled to the sciences and business (see Section 4.1 for the list). Similarly, as 
our scope is on corporate communication after a data breach, articles should be relevant to 
this intersection of topics. Once selected, each article is examined using thematic analysis 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006), and a series of codes and themes produced which provide insight 
into the article and the relevance of its findings. Further detail is provided in Section 4. 
 
3.2 Real-world Case Analysis 
 
To complement the literature review, we next investigate cases of real-world data breaches 
to understand company responses in the context of commentary from industry specialists; in 
this commentary, we particularly consider the efficacy of the communication that occurred. 
While there are various sources which catalogue data breach cases (e.g., Morgan, 2018), 
official sources are preferable given their reputation and reliability. To assist in the sampling 
of cases, we scope our research to the UK. This decision is based on the reality that most 
research (e.g., Wang and Johnson, 2018; Wang and Park, 2017) has focused on the USA, and 
that the UK is another major economy (in Europe and worldwide) worthy of study in general 
and for comparison. Based on these criteria, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) 
and, in particular, its Threat Report publication (NCSC, 2019a) is selected as a source for cases. 
These reports are published regularly and contain information on major cyber security 
breaches, including incidents that may not necessarily be subject to investigation. While the 
NCSC does not publish the specific criteria used to select incidents, thus making it challenging 
to comment on completeness, given its remit (to provide guidance on UK cyber security and 
its insights into cyberattacks targeting businesses across the country) we view it as a reliable 
and robust source of pertinent incidents. 
 
Systematic review of 
literature
Real-world case analysis
Evaluation of literature 
review and case analysis 
findings 
Develop, evaluate and 
refine framework
Academic 
best practice
Industry 
best practice
Best practice 
guidance
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Having established the sampling approach for the data breaches, a similar mechanism is 
required for ascertaining security commentators who reflect on breaches and the response 
of the organisation. A robust method is essential to identify a suitable set of sources to ensure 
the credibility of the assessment of what may be regarded as effective and poor 
communication. While we could openly search online for commentators, we note that 
references to security commentators are also often included in the NCSC threat reports. 
Although these tend to reference a single source, it is possible, by analysing all of the 
commentators cited, to obtain a set of commentators who can be used as sources for security 
commentary on the selected cases. The NCSC threat reports are therefore selected as a 
source. Similar to the literature review, thematic analysis is applied to data gathered in this 
second stage to provide further insight pertinent to our research aim. We provide additional 
detail in Section 5. 
 
3.3 Evaluation of Literature Review and Case Analyses 
 
Based on the findings from academic literature (including suggested best practice) and real-
life scenarios (i.e., from security commentators) we look to develop an improved 
understanding of what factors may drive effective and poor crisis communication following a 
malicious cyber security breach. The themes and observations gathered from the systematic 
literature review and case analyses are therefore compared and evaluated in order to 
establish consistencies and differences. This also enables an assessment of how current 
practice found in the case studies differs from, or follows, the best practice in the literature. 
We apply the technique of cognitive mapping (Miles et al., 2014) to allow the themes, 
patterns and their relationships to be examined and more clearly compared. This, therefore, 
provides the foundation for our key findings and the framework’s development. We expand 
on this work in Section 6.    
 
3.4 Develop, Evaluate and Refine Framework 
 
Using the insights from earlier research stages, we create a framework that is able to inform 
organisations in the preparation and execution of cyber incident response plans pertaining to 
corporate communications. The framework combines best practice and recommendations in 
a structured, coherent format suitable for businesses in planning for and reacting to a cyber 
security breach. To evaluate our proposals, we conduct a series of semi-structured interviews 
with senior industry practitioners (e.g., potential users of the framework), including CISO-
level, and also experts involved with crisis communication after a cyber security incident (e.g., 
directors and leads in crisis management organisations); this latter group is perfectly placed 
to comment on the framework’s contributions. Interviews are used in preference to other 
methods, such as questionnaires, as they allow the capture of in-depth feedback (Burdon and 
Coles-Kemp, 2019). Interview findings are then analysed using thematic analysis and the 
framework is refined to incorporate these insights. Additional information is provided in 
Sections 6 and 7. 
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4. Reviewing Cyber Crisis Communication Literature 
4.1 Sampling Strategy 
 
Academic literature can provide a strong foundation for an investigation. In the case of 
communication and public relations following a data breach, however, an initial literature 
review found a limited body of work on the subject. Indeed, this is underscored by Gwebu et 
al. (2018) who highlight the lack of understanding of how organisations should respond 
effectively to a data breach. In our systematic review therefore, we sought to adopt a broad 
and more inclusive method to increase the likelihood of finding suitable articles. 
 
In the context of the PRISMA approach (Moher et al., 2009), we first identified a series of 
databases to search and search terms to use. The databases selected were Business Source 
Complete, Web of Science, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Emerald Insight, and IEEE 
Xplore. These are well-recognised databases and have been used in similar systematic 
literature reviews in the field of cyber security (Spanos and Angelis, 2016; Lezzi et al., 2018). 
They also allow the identification of peer-reviewed articles, which increases the likelihood of 
finding high quality, objective contributions. As our research is focused broadly on security, 
incidents and communication, these formed the core topics of the search terms, and 
synonyms and alternative terms were used for completeness. The final search string used 
was: ("cyber security" OR "cybersecurity" OR "systems security" OR "network security" OR 
"information security" OR "cyber crisis") AND ("data breach" OR "hack" OR "incident") AND 
("communication" OR "announcement" OR "stakeholder management" OR "notification"). 
This query was executed in each database, and where possible, applied to the title, abstract 
or keywords; this is a common technique (Fernández-Alemán et al., 2013; Lezzi et al., 2018) 
and increases the likelihood of finding relevant articles.  
 
In total, 3516 articles were found; following deduplication, this was reduced to 3405 articles. 
In line with PRISMA, the dataset was screened to ensure only relevant articles were 
considered. This consisted of a pre-screening activity, where article titles, abstracts and full-
texts were reviewed for relevance. This resulted in 197 articles. Two eligibility criteria were 
then applied. Firstly, only articles from well-regarded and cited journals were included. This 
was to increase the likelihood that the credibility of the literature would be high. The Journal 
Citation Report (JCR) (Clarivate Analytics, 2019) provides a mechanism to compare journals 
based on citation data and although this does not in itself determine the value of a 
publication, it establishes that other authors are referencing its papers. In order, therefore, 
to ensure that academically robust articles were used in this study, those without JCR values 
were discarded. Secondly, articles published before January 2009 were excluded. Although 
the quality of an article cannot be seen as being related to its age, changes in practice, 
technology and legislation can make its findings immaterial, hence our decision. These 
eligibility criteria excluded a further 152 articles resulting in a final set of 45.   
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Figure 2 – PRISMA flow diagram 
 
In Figure 2, the sampling strategy, including totals of articles excluded at each stage are 
summarised.   
  
 
4.2 Extracting Research Themes 
 
The articles identified were then analysed using the thematic analysis approach outlined by 
Braun and Clarke (2006). The process of familiarisation and code generation was performed 
against the articles with the resulting codes grouped into an initial set of categories. Although 
the research aim provided the context for the analysis, it was not used to restrict the code 
generation process. Areas of research that may help inform the debate around effective 
communication following a data breach are potentially multidisciplinary, therefore any 
attempt to restrict coding at an early stage could overlook noteworthy insights. The code 
generation approach consequently resulted in a broad range of categories representing 
several domains. These were subsequently reviewed to identify themes. To explore these 
further, cognitive mapping was used as it allows data to be visualised and commonalities and 
patterns more clearly identified (Miles et al., 2014).  
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4.3 Analysis of Key Findings from Cyber Crisis Communication Literature 
 
A sample of the themes identified is presented in Table 1, along with the number of articles 
and codes related to each theme. This provides a useful indicator of how many times codes 
connected with each theme were identified and the breadth of articles they were found in.  
 
Theme Articles (Codes) 
Stock market reaction 15 (54) 
Legal Requirement to Notify 11 (47) 
Message Framing 12 (50) 
Not Disclosing 11 (17) 
Protecting Reputation 11 (36) 
Negative Emotions 6 (24) 
Word of Mouth 3 (7) 
Complexities with Outsourced Functions 1 (6) 
Table 1 – Sample of themes derived from the review 
 
Below we discuss a selection of the most pertinent of these themes for our research, followed 
by a more general reflection on other relevant themes.  
 
4.3.1 Stock Market Reaction 
 
A significant number of articles focused on the stock market impact of data breaches.  Most, 
but not all articles reported an initial drop in share price following a data breach. The 
temporary nature of this drop was seen by some researchers as the result of the “knee jerk” 
reaction of ill-informed investors, rather than a product of the organisation’s effective or poor 
communications approach (Wang et al., 2013). Other factors such as the size of the data 
breach, the company’s industry segment (Hinz et al., 2015) and the nature of its products 
(Jeong et al., 2018) were also highlighted. One article, however, argued that stock market 
reaction was greater for organisations that already had poor reputations. It further asserted 
that their use of communications strategies to demonstrate that the organisation is 
committed to stakeholders and to addressing the problem can reduce the impact on its share 
price (Gwebu et al., 2018). Whilst this is only a single article, it does suggest that ‘image 
renewal’ strategies such as these may be effective and beneficial to companies, particularly 
those already perceived as tainted by the public. 
 
4.3.2 Legal Requirement to Notify 
 
The regulatory environment associated with data breaches was discussed by several 
researchers. In particular, the requirement to notify data protection authorities and impacted 
data subjects were assessed. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for instance, 
stipulates communication should be used to mitigate the risk of harm to individuals but that 
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this should be balanced against ensuring the cost of this to the organisation is not too 
overwhelming (de Hert and Papakonstantinou, 2016).  Other studies highlighted that 
adequate encryption of the data lost may be sufficient, thus suggesting that communication 
to data subjects is not always required (Nieuwesteeg and Faure, 2018).  Also of interest were 
studies that considered other jurisdictions, most notably Australia and the United States 
(Burdon et al., 2010; Rosati et al., 2017). These, combined with other articles that draw 
attention to legislation for specific industry segments such as telecommunications, suggest 
that whilst GDPR provides a legal basis for disclosure of a data breach to the public, other 
legislation may apply, particularly where people in other countries are impacted. This multi-
jurisdictional complexity regarding disclosure rules should therefore be considered as part of 
an effective communications approach. 
 
4.3.3 Message Framing 
 
Of particular interest are the insights provided on the framing of communications following a 
data breach. Messaging framing can be seen as a method for distilling complex ideas into 
clear, compelling and digestible dialogue (de Bruijn and Janssen, 2017). This can be used 
following a breach to ensure stakeholders are informed appropriately. Whilst the use of such 
framing strategies is central to the SCCT approach (Syed, 2018), other techniques such as Error 
Management (Zhang et al., 2019) and Extended Parallel Processing Model (EPPM) (Oh et al., 
2018) were also identified as potential framing strategies. These alternatives, therefore, may 
need to be reviewed alongside SCCT as organisations decide what is a suitable approach to 
communication. 
 
4.3.4 Other Themes 
 
The emotional impact of the data breach on those affected was discussed by multiple 
researchers (Chen and Jai, 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Syed, 2018; Janakiraman et al., 2018). The 
vulnerability felt by individuals impacted by a breach was highlighted (Janakiraman et al., 
2018), as were the different negative emotions directed at organisations dependent on the 
crisis stage and where the perceived blame was attributed (Syed, 2018). A link was also 
determined between the resulting negative emotions and ‘negative word of mouth’ which 
could in turn damage the organisation’s reputation. It can, therefore, be seen as crucial that 
an effective communications strategy recognise and attempt to alleviate the negative feelings 
of those affected. 
 
Another point that warrants discussion is the complexities associated with outsourced 
functions. This was investigated by Modi et al. (2015) who highlight the difficulties in 
coordinating responses and the potential negative public reaction due to customers often 
being unaware of the third parties involved in their transactions. This can often lead to 
strained relations with suppliers and to a greater impact on the company’s share price. This 
view is complemented by Porcedda (2018) who describes the care that should be taken by 
organisations processing sensitive data, such as hospitals when dealing with breaches 
involving cloud-service providers. Although not seen as a complete solution, the use of 
contracts to establish responsibilities was put forward as beneficial. This may have a 
significant bearing on data breach communications and could, therefore, be considered as 
part of an effective approach.         
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5. Analysing Real-world Data Breach Communications 
5.1 Sampling Strategy 
 
As introduced in Section 3, NCSC threat reports were identified as an appropriate source of 
both notable data breaches within UK companies, and for the definition of relevant cyber 
security commentators. Our sampling strategy therefore began by collecting the incidents 
identified by these reports; this resulted in a listing of 128 potential cases from threat reports 
between 23 September 2016 and 3 May 2019 inclusive. Cases were then screened to establish 
whether they were associated with data breaches and were UK-centric. We interpreted UK-
centric to mean that the organisation could be considered as a UK company or that UK 
individuals were primarily impacted by the breach. Therefore, organisations such as British 
Airways (BA), which is regarded as the ‘British Flag Carrier’, would be included even though 
they are ultimately owned by Spain’s IAG Group. Table 2 lists the data breaches defined. 
 
 
Organisation Month Breach 
Reported 
Deliveroo January 2019 
B&Q January 2019 
British Airways (BA) September 2018 
Superdrug August 2018 
Butlins August 2018 
Dixons Carphone  June 2018 
Clarksons November 2017 
PageUp (Whitbread) June 2018 
Ticketmaster June 2018 
Great Western Rail April 2018 
Sodexo February 2018 
National Lottery - Camelot March 2018 
Deloitte September 2017 
Hotpoint UK April 2017 
Table 2 – UK-Centric data breaches identified 
 
To identify suitable commentators, a similar approach to the method for selecting cases was 
used. This involved reviewing the threat reports sampled for references that represent 
potential third-party sources. These could be explicit, such as “Security researcher Chris 
Vickery has reported…” (NCSC, 2017), or a reference via a hyperlink. Through this review, we 
identified 229 references to third parties. Each of these was then reviewed and categorised 
according to whether it was commentary from a security specialist, a report from a 
government body, news agency or security company, or a self-report from the organisation 
breached. Where possible commentators were identified, an assessment of their website and 
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other online reports was conducted to establish whether they could be considered as 
appropriate; for instance, if they previously covered security issues, possess a reputation in 
the security field, etc. The commentators selected were:  Schneier on Security, Brian Krebs, 
Troy Hunt, Chris Vickery, Oliver Hough, Gabor Szathmari, We Live Security, Cyberscoop and 
Ars Technica. Having determined both the case studies and the commentators, a search of 
each of the commentator’s websites was performed. This allowed us to gather any relevant 
incident analysis or discussion on each case from all of these sources.  
 
5.2 Analysis of Key Findings from Commentator Reviews 
 
The analysis of commentator data was conducted using the same process as outlined in 
Section 3.2, and led to several important themes being defined. We present a sample of the 
themes in Table 3, along with the number of commentaries and codes related to each theme. 
Theme Commentaries (Codes) 
Credibility of Statement 12 (22) 
Downplaying 6 (8) 
Media Spin 6 (9) 
Not Disclosing or Delaying 4 (9) 
Focus on the Customer 6 (6) 
Previous Breaches in Same Company 3 (3) 
Admission of responsibility 2 (2) 
Table 3 – Sample of themes derived from commentator reviews 
 
In what follows, we briefly explore some of the most relevant themes to our research.  
 
5.2.1 Credibility of Statement 
 
The credibility of statements made by organisations suffering a data breach was questioned 
by commentators. Hunt, for instance, repeatedly stated “I find this a little bit hard to believe” 
when discussing the statement made by the UK National Lottery recommending their 10.5 
million users reset their user IDs and passwords following reported suspicious activity on 150 
accounts (Hunt, 2018b). BA’s account of their own data breach timeline was also questioned 
by researchers who were able to analyse the certificate used by hackers to mimic its website 
(O'Donnell, 2018b). Finally, the actions of Ticketmaster in attempting to blame a third-party 
supplier resulted in a strong public response from them (Shoorbajee, 2018b). In that case, 
after being accused of providing insecure software, the third-party publicly responded by 
arguing that Ticketmaster had failed to notify them that Ticketmaster were deploying it to 
their payments page; and that, if they had known, they would have advised it was insecure. 
They also added that Ticketmaster was the only customer impacted. Validating statements to 
ensure they make sense and are backed up in fact, can, therefore, be seen as an important 
element of effective data-breach communication. It can also be argued that blaming partners 
may incite public disagreements which may be considered an ill-advised crisis strategy. 
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5.2.2 Not Disclosing or Delaying 
 
The timing of communication relative to the data breach and whether the organisation 
chooses to inform the public may also impact credibility. In the cases of Dixons Carphone and 
BA, questions were raised over whether the public was informed in a timely manner. Deloitte, 
however, appeared only to find out they had been breached months after the event. Reports 
by Cyberscoop (Bing, 2017) also suggest that the story was first made public by The Guardian 
news outlet rather than the company itself. This reluctance to admit they had been 
compromised is understandable given Deloitte provides cyber security services to many 
major organisations (Krebs, 2017). That being said, the delay may have prompted the whistle-
blower that informed The Guardian to act, resulting in negative publicity for the firm.  
 
From the case of Deloitte, it may be argued that organisations should aim to communicate 
soon after they discover the data breach. This would however suggest that even if only 
partial information is available, the firm may have to estimate the number of impacted 
parties. This seems to have been the case for BA who had to revise their numbers upwards 
from 380,000 (Foltyn, 2018a) to 429,000 (Seals, 2018a). This topic highlights the dynamic 
between the need to communicate quickly and the time required to understand the situation 
and provide accurate information. It is thus important that the timing of external 
communication is considered as part of any effective guidance. 
 
5.2.3 Focus on the Customer 
 
Commentators also discussed the steps firms were taking to protect those impacted by the 
breach. For instance, a Threatpost commentator summarised the steps BA was taking to 
ensure customers were not out of pocket (Foltyn, 2018a). This type of approach involving 
communicating compensation facilities to customers if they are subject to fraud was, 
however, criticised by another commentator for ‘causing complacency’ (Anscombe, 2019). He 
describes his own experience where his credit card was used for money laundering because, 
he implies, his details had been stolen months earlier as part of the BA breach.  Having been 
subject to this type of crime, his view was that organisations need to communicate more 
about what they are doing to pursue the criminals. This theme of ‘facing up to the bad guys’ 
was reinforced by another commentator’s praise for Clarkson’s response to its breach by 
informing the police and accelerating its implementation of additional security measures 
(Cluley, 2017). Consequently, it may be concluded that such offers of compensation and 
protection should be outlined in communications along with a determination to support law 
enforcement in order to track down the perpetrators.    
 
5.2.4 Other Themes 
 
Downplaying was a tactic used by a number of companies in an attempt to reduce the 
perceived significance of the attack. Deloitte, in particular, was reported as trying to 
‘downplay’ their data breach by both Krebs (2017) and Schneier (2017). BA, meanwhile, 
highlighted that there was no evidence of fraud (Shoorbajee, 2018a), whilst Dixons Carphone 
stated that the data did not include PIN or CVV information (Foltyn, 2018b). Whilst this may 
be a statement of fact at that time, this position is undermined by the personal stories of loss 
after the event, such as that by Anscombe as discussed previously, and by Hunt (2018a), 
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whose Have I Been Pwned site (https://haveibeenpwned.com) demonstrates that stolen data 
is available to be used long after the breach itself. As this is likely to be recognised by media 
and the general public alike, such an approach may be counter-productive.      
 
Many of the organisations studied apologised for the data breach. Clarkson’s CEO “sincerely 
apologise[d] for any concern” due to the incident (Cluley, 2017) and the CEO of Dixons 
Carphone admitted the company had ‘fallen short’ (O'Donnell, 2018a). Admission of 
responsibility and work to address security weaknesses was seen as key to restoring 
consumer trust by a report cited by Threatpost (Seals, 2018b). This suggests that this type of 
response, whilst uncomfortable for organisations, may have some merit in the long term.  
 
Multiple commentators reflected on previous breaches that the impacted companies, notably 
BA (Foltyn, 2018a) and Dixons Carphone (Foltyn, 2018b), had suffered; this was possibly trying 
to imply they had not learnt lessons from prior incidents. This was particularly salient in cases 
where current post-breach communications had claimed to be sorry for the new breach and 
leak of customer data. From an effective communications perspective, a noteworthy point is 
that organisations need to be careful in how messages are crafted especially in situations 
where they have been subject to incidents in the past. Next, we use the findings of this 
analysis of commentaries and the systematic review to develop the framework.  
 
 
6. Developing a Framework for Effective Corporate 
Communications 
 
From the analyses in Sections 4 and 5, several key points have emerged which can be related 
to effective and poor corporate communication following a data breach. These are further 
evaluated and compared in this section in order to understand whether there is a consistency 
between the guidance derived from these sources. Using these findings, a framework is 
proposed that seeks to provide support to organisations on how they can provide effective 
external communication following a malicious data breach.  
        
6.1 Analysis and Comparison of Findings  
 
In order to assess the findings thus far, a cognitive mapping method was used (Miles et al., 
2014). This provided a clear representation of the abstracted data from the two prior 
analyses, allowing the visual examination of results. Several themes identified were 
considered particularly relevant to our research aim, and were further enhanced to develop 
our framework. Below, we present a selection of the some of these to provide insights into 
how our framework was built.  
 
6.1.1 Blame and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 
 
SCCT provides a framework of categories of crises which allows organisations to select a 
communication response strategy appropriate to a given scenario (Coombs and Holladay, 
2002). In terms of data breaches, an experiment by Chen and Jai (2018) determined a partial 
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correlation between reduced trust and organisational responsibility for a breach. This is 
supplemented by Syed (2018) who posits that perceived accountability for the loss of 
personal information can lead to negative emotions potentially resulting in deprecatory social 
media posts from impacted individuals. Both pieces of research, however, show variability in 
participant responses, with Syed identifying changes in emotional response depending on the 
crisis stage. It is also important to recognise the role that the media has in framing public 
perception. Chen and Jai (2018) for instance, argued that by receiving a data breach message 
via the media, individuals are more likely to consider the enterprise culpable. This may be 
seen as significant, given the confidence people can have in these sources (Kulikova et al., 
2012).  
 
When applied to data breaches, the approach advocated by SCCT of establishing 
responsibility may lead organisations to look at the perpetrators or other parties as culpable 
and see themselves as victims. This appears to be the case in the TalkTalk example where the 
CEO highlighted that she had been a victim herself (BBC, 2015a). Though within this study, 
this technique was only used by Ticketmaster who attempted to blame a supplier, this 
hypothesis is supported by other research which has established this as a method used by 
businesses (Wang and Johnson, 2018; Wang and Park, 2017). It can, therefore, be concluded 
that it is still utilised for such incidents.  
 
The results of apportioning blame can be seen from the commentary associated with the 
Ticketmaster breach, where a conflicting and seemingly plausible account was given by the 
supplier (Shoorbajee, 2018b). Such public disagreements can only be detrimental to a 
business’ attempt to protect its reputation. From the commentator analysis, the use of 
apologies and actions to mitigate the risk of harm to the data subject have been the subject 
of praise. This suggests that organisations that take responsibility and are seen to be 
proactively trying to address the problem are perceived in a positive light. This is supported 
by some of the research found in the systematic literature review (Janakiraman et al., 2018; 
Soomro et al., 2019). In particular, Wei et al. (2017) found that error management techniques 
could be used following a data breach to improve customer perceptions and this appears to 
be corroborated by further studies (Zhang et al., 2019; Berezina et al., 2012).  
 
Although the value of taking responsibility appears clear, a number of themes were identified 
in both data sets with regards to the risk of litigation. This is brought into context by the in 
excess of 240 lawsuits raised against Equifax following their data breach in 2017 (Berkman et 
al., 2018). Dependent on the jurisdiction, these actions can result in a significant cost to an 
organisation in terms of damages and legal fees. This has, however, to be balanced against 
the onerous sanctions that can be applied against businesses should authorities find they 
have not followed their obligations to inform impacted data subjects (ICO, 2019a). It is also 
important to recognise that class actions do not necessarily fall on the side of the plaintiff, 
with the burden of proof in some regions, notably the USA, requiring evidence of actual harm 
as a result of the breach. This can be difficult to ascertain, given the amount of personal data 
freely available due to other data breaches. It can thus be argued, that the risk of litigation is 
now outweighed by the positive effects of organisations taking responsibility for the crisis and 
the reduced risk of fines from relevant Data Protection Authorities (DPAs).  
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6.1.2 Security Basics 
 
The protection of data subjects by organisations has been seen as an important consideration 
following a breach. The commentary from Hunt around the intentions of the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) with regards culpability for credential stuffing attacks, however, suggests 
that companies should be mindful of key security controls in their data breach crisis planning 
(Hunt, 2018c). This is reinforced by the disclosure rules, which show that within some 
jurisdictions the use of up-to-date encryption can mitigate the risk of harm sufficiently so that 
firms do not need to notify impacted individuals. Without such mechanisms in place, 
corporations may be subject to criticism, particularly if they have not learnt lessons from 
similar previous attacks (Syed, 2018; Hawkins, 2015). Our analysis in Section 5 determined 
that the media is very likely to emphasize previous failures with a resulting impact on 
reputations. As part of their crisis communication planning therefore, businesses should 
ensure the security basics against which they may be held to account are in place.  
 
6.1.3 External Partners 
 
The public disagreement between Ticketmaster and its supplier, discussed earlier, highlights 
the multifaceted arrangements that are often in place for modern products and services. This 
can make dealing with the aftermath of a data breach more complex and in particular, 
requires communication to be coordinated between parties. This can be difficult given the 
potential for strained relationships. Where practicable, it is therefore advisable to ensure 
contracts with service partners include provisions for data breaches and that they are 
involved with data breach crisis planning. 
 
6.1.4 Borderless Nature of the Internet 
 
An article identified as part of the commentator analysis claimed that BA was faced with a 
potential $650 million class-action lawsuit (O'Donnell, 2018b). Although not explicitly stated, 
this suggests that customers from the USA were impacted. This reinforces the earlier point—
the internet is borderless and the data subjects impacted by a breach may reside in or be 
protected by the laws of multiple jurisdictions. This can have a number of implications for 
post-data breach crisis communications, in particular, whether data subjects need to be 
notified and the timing of such disclosure. Given the complexity of jurisdictions within some 
regions, it is therefore important that organisations understand in advance their legal 
obligations in the countries in which they trade. 
 
6.2 Development of the Framework 
 
From a detailed analysis and comparison of the key points pertaining to effective 
communication, we developed a framework aimed at supporting organisations in their 
approach towards external communication after a data breach. The process of cognitive 
mapping allowed related themes to be grouped together providing further abstractions. For 
instance, multiple themes from the systematic review were found to be associated with 
possible ‘organisation aims’, and therefore were grouped. Through a review of the associated 
codes and source literature, these were found to be possible organisational aims post-breach 
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and, because this was supported by evidence from the case studies, they were included in the 
framework under the title ‘Establish aims post breach’.   
 
In cases where contradictory effective communications guidance was evident, an assessment 
was made of the weight of the opposing viewpoints in terms of the supporting academic 
articles, whether the theme was present in both results and, if necessary, against further 
scholarly or industry sources. The guidance of ‘accept responsibility’ (after a breach) is such 
an example. The concept of organisational responsibility for personal data was found in 
themes within both result sets. Whilst some contradictory data was found in the ‘risk of being 
sued’ theme, this was negated by codes in the same theme suggesting that the risk of 
litigation is reduced if data breaches are disclosed early and that there was a burden of proof 
for plaintiffs. This weight of evidence meant this theme was included in the framework within 
a section titled, “Frame the Message”. We adopted similar techniques to construct the 
broader framework. 
  
We present the framework that resulted from our analysis in Figures 3, 4 and 5; three figures 
were initially used for ease of presentation. The framework is split into two main areas, and 
each has several best practice guidance points as well as aspects that organisations need to 
consider. Here, we remind readers that this is an initial version of the framework which will 
be assessed and refined later. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Framework: Before Cyber Crisis 
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Figure 4 – Framework: Cyber Crisis Response (focusing on decision contexts) 
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Figure 5 – Framework: Cyber Crisis Response (focusing on how to frame the data breach 
message) 
 
The first area, Before Cyber Crisis (Figure 3), focuses on planning activities that must be 
engaged in preparation for the possibility of a data breach. It includes organisations 
establishing post-breach aims, identifying an updated knowledge base and incorporating 
business partners in plans. The second area, Cyber Crisis Response (Figures 4 and 5), 
concentrates on the activities necessary in the case of a data breach crisis event (with the 
assumption that sensitive or personal data has been breached). A disclosure decision model 
is outlined which presents a series of steps to assist organisations in deciding whether, what 
(e.g., framing the communications), when and how to disclose an incident. Together, the 
various points presented in these figures seek to distil the best practices on effective 
corporate communication surrounding a data breach.  
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Briefly reflecting on the framework, many of its components cover general corporate 
communications and announcements, such as disclosure means, timelines and message 
content. These are areas that are likely to also be crucial in incidents where businesses need 
to communicate or announce an unintentional data breach, i.e., one without a malicious 
nature. The most significant difference may be in the discussion about blame (see ‘frame the 
message’ in Figure 3). With incidents involving an unintentional exposure of data, typically 
the organisation (via its employees or stakeholders) is indisputably at fault and thus cannot 
reassign blame away from itself or act as a victim. In such cases therefore, it may be even 
more crucial to quickly assume responsibility and act. Consequently, while it is not possible 
to comment definitively on the applicability of the framework in supporting unintentional 
data breaches given our scope, it may be promising.  
 
 
7. Validating and Refining the Framework  
7.1 Participants 
 
Whilst based on robust methods, the aforementioned framework and findings it embodies 
are theoretical in nature. In order to evaluate whether it addressed the gap identified in 
industry practice, we therefore sought to validate it through semi-structured interviews with 
senior industry professionals, both in the cyber security and public relations and 
communications fields. Participants were selected using a purposive sampling approach 
(Etikan et al., 2016) due to the impracticability of obtaining relevant individuals of the 
necessary seniority and expertise using probability sampling methods. This method can be 
seen as an effective way to obtain ‘hard to reach populations’ and has been used in similar 
studies (Unkelos-Shpigel et al., 2015).  
 
In total, 32 people were approached using various professional networks both online and 
offline. They represent a broad selection of executives and senior managers across a range of 
industries. A total of 13 agreed to participate; Table 4 presents their demographics.  
 
 
Ref. Role  Years’ 
experience 
Industry Organisation Size 
(Turnover) 
P1 Chief Risk and Compliance 
Officer 
30+ in 
Security/IT 
Financial Services >£1B 
P2 Chief Information Officer 30+ in 
Security/IT 
Retail >£1B 
P3 Information Security Manager 6+ in Security/IT Logistics >£1B 
P4 Head of Cyber Security 30+ in 
Security/IT 
Retail >£1B 
P5 Head of IT Operations and 
Security 
20+ in 
Security/IT 
Manufacturing >£1B 
P6 Head of Information Security 13+ in 
Security/IT 
Financial Services >£1B 
P7 Director 20+ in 
Security/IT 
Professional Services <£1M 
P8 Director 30+ in 
Security/IT 
Professional Services >£1B 
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P9 Chief Information Security 
Officer 
20+ in 
Security/IT 
Professional Services £500M-£1B 
P10 Chief Information Security 
Officer 
15+ in 
Security/IT 
Not for Profit >£1B 
P11 Director 30+ in 
Security/IT 
Professional Services <£1M 
P12 Director 30+ in Corporate 
Communications 
/ Public 
Relations 
Professional Services <£1M 
P13 Head of Crisis Management 27+ in Corporate 
Communications 
/ Public 
Relations 
Professional Services £500M-£1B 
Table 4 – Demographic information of interview participants 
 
 
To allow for a more meaningful discussion, prior to the interview, each participant received 
an interview pack detailing the aims of the framework and the framework itself. The questions 
asked were based on the framework, its potential value and applicability in supporting 
businesses in corporate communications in the event of a cyber incident. The interviews 
lasted up to one hour, with each recorded and transcribed, before then being analysed using 
thematic analysis. This study received ethical approval through our institution’s institutional 
review board (IRB).  
 
7.2 Findings and Discussion 
7.2.1 Framework Feedback 
 
From an analysis of interviewee responses, we found that perceptions were overwhelmingly 
positive. In particular, interviewees complimented the structure and the comprehensive 
nature of the framework. For instance, when asked about their reaction to the framework 
P11 commented: 
 “I think it is very well-conceived. Very well structured, and I think should absolutely 
result in good decisions around communications being made.” 
Two participants (P7, P13) independently articulated that the framework crystallised their 
thinking. This suggests that the framework resonated with these professionals and also that 
they ascribed to the practices it put forward. In particular, several participants felt the 
framework would help them improve their cyber crisis response by providing them with a 
codified structure to facilitate the rollout of crisis communication capability. Other 
interviewees felt that they did not need to change their approach to crisis communications 
following a data breach in light of this research, as the findings aligned with their current 
practice. P4, for instance, stated: 
“We might not have it written down like this or in this type of model. But I think we 
probably mirror this quite a lot in how we actually practice.” 
This is an interesting reaction which, upon follow-up, highlighted a clear endorsement of the 
framework generally. 
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The few interviewees who said they would change their current practice (in light of the 
framework) admitted this because they wanted to adopt what they viewed as the best 
practice which it aptly captured. Others felt they should adopt the framework within their 
organisations or for their customers (e.g., in the case of public relations service firms). In some 
instances, this appeared to be as a result of a perceived lack of maturity in their current 
approach. On these bases, therefore, it can be seen that the framework was welcomed by 
these professionals as a novel and informative approach to outlining security incident 
communication practice. Given the level of industry experience present in the participants 
interviewed, it is also encouraging that many were interested in adopting the approach and 
all but one made unsolicited requests to be provided with the final version of the framework.  
 
Of particular interest were the aspects of the framework that interviewees took time to 
explore in greater detail. For instance, speaking about the framework’s pre-event stage, some 
participants viewed the framework’s guidance as crucial as they allowed organisations to 
think through how they would communicate given different scenarios, agree on the wording 
of communication and rehearse incident response. P4 commented: 
 “Rehearse it; we talk about muscle memory… Once you’ve been through that 
[rehearsals and practicing corporate response] with the right people you don’t have to 
spend a lot of time on it again. We know the answer’s “no”, because we remember we 
went through this.”  
The importance and implications of the multijurisdictional nature of breaches was another 
aspect of the framework’s stages welcomed by participants. P6 and P7 discussed their own 
experiences of the various regulatory regimes highlighting the contrasting approaches of 
different countries, whilst others such as P13 were more unconcerned as they felt they would 
utilise specialist legal advice if required.  They did not, however, disagree with the need to 
consider jurisdictional issues as part of their crisis response. This point, as well as the others 
highlighted above, provide an encouraging review of the framework, by specialists with 
substantial experience and expertise. 
 
It was notable that participants were in support of organisations taking responsibility for 
breaches and not using SCCT strategies, i.e., framing the organisation as purely being the 
victim. P11 noted: 
“When I read it [SCCT], I completely disagreed with it. And it’s never a practice that we 
have put in place for our clients. I guess what I’m saying is that I completely concur 
with your conclusion.” 
Indeed, a majority of interviewees were adamant that organisations were ill-advised to 
portray themselves as victims during a cyber crisis.  This was reinforced by the discourse on 
responsibility where an overwhelming majority of the participants supported the view in the 
framework that organisations should accept responsibility for the data loss. Some of the 
complexities prevalent within supply chains – where data was lost by a partner – were pointed 
out by participants, but the predominant view was that public-facing organisations should 
accept responsibility as customers entrusted them to be custodians of their data.  
 
Many participants agreed with the need to front communications via the CEO. P2 elaborated 
on this highlighting the importance of ensuring they are briefed with the right information to 
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be able to deliver the message agreed by the board. One participant, P6, added the caveat 
that the CEO needed to be capable of delivering the message effectively, whilst P11 discussed 
the need to ensure the CEO is only involved in cyber crises (instead of smaller data breaches) 
as otherwise, this may exaggerate the seriousness of a low impact incident. The framework 
also seemed to align with the methods used by interviewees to communicate, with P12 
recalling use of both social media and email to contact affected parties. The use of telephone 
communication was also covered by participants with both P9 and P12 highlighting contacting 
people by telephone as a viable medium.  
 
A final notable point highlighted by P1 was that the framework also considers communication 
with internal staff in cases of cyber crises: 
“So, one of the things I was pleased to see was about briefing internal staff. It’s actually 
in my experience one that kind of gets forgotten, is when companies and boards, in 
particular, spend a lot of time worrying about reputational damage, stock market 
values, partner things and forget that their employees can feel, why didn’t anybody 
tell me”.  
This is a salient finding for our work as it demonstrates that the framework addresses a 
current challenge in practice, and could potentially add real value to the industry.   
 
7.2.2 Refining the framework  
 
Although the feedback on the framework was positive, participants also provided critiques 
for aspects of the framework. These were grouped into themes and were reviewed with the 
aim of improving the framework. This review considered factors such as the number of 
participants aligned to the theme and the prominence of the theme within the transcripts. 
Where there were obvious omissions, or where reasonable amendments were warranted, 
these were also used to enhance the framework. In total, 18 amendments were made. A 
selection representing themes of particular interest are discussed in the remainder of this 
section, before then presenting the refined framework. 
 
A significant number of interviewees focused on the security basics guidance within the initial 
framework. P8, for instance, felt that organisations needed to establish a full range of 
countermeasures, whereas P7 critiqued each of the measures outlined and P9 felt two-factor 
authentication was outmoded. P12, however, suggested that the framework should build on 
existing security standards thereby incorporating best practice. Including a section on security 
basics in the initial framework was intended to induce organisations to consider obvious 
security controls pre-event to ensure they had a compelling narrative should a breach occur.  
Although these comments may be due to the background of interviewees, the security basics 
guidance seemed to represent a distraction from the communication focus of the framework. 
This pre-event guidance was therefore reframed to focus on assessing security gaps thus 
avoiding debate on security basics whilst still prompting organisations to ensure any security 
weaknesses are reflected in their cyber crisis communication preparations and messaging. 
 
Another area was testing and rehearsals. Both P2 and P4 were strong advocates of rehearsals 
as a key element of crisis planning and preparation. They highlighted its importance in 
improving decision making and facing up to the difficult judgement calls associated with data 
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breach crisis management. In particular, the involvement of the CEO in rehearsals and the use 
of simulations for honing media communications were advocated as good communications 
practice. 
“We didn’t quite do a media interview but we had a media guy in the simulation who 
would ask questions like this and our CEO would say, and ‘I would answer questions 
like this’. It was a bit third-party. They sort of rehearsed.” [P4] 
Other participants also discussed rehearsals and testing in the context of their current 
practice. P10, for instance, was concerned that the regular readiness exercises he convened 
were not taken seriously by some senior stakeholders. P11 felt that organisations that had 
properly trained for cyber crises were more likely to ‘perform well’. These references to 
rehearsals, training and testing by different interviewees appear to ascribe to the importance 
of this aspect of pre-event preparation. Although involving suppliers in rehearsals were 
included in the draft framework on reflection this did not give it adequate coverage and it 
was therefore given its own section in the updated framework. 
 
There was also another key point related to supporting the board. Providing the CEO with an 
opportunity to test out media strategies aligns with points made by P1. Like a number of the 
other participants, P1 felt that the communication should come from the top of the 
organisation, but he also suggested that the message would be developed through 
deliberation by the board of directors. To be able to do this effectively, the participant argued, 
the company’s officers required support and education, as well as governance. This was 
needed to provide structure to the way data breach incidents were handled to prevent them 
being immediately escalated to the top without due consideration, along with help with 
framing the message and dealing with complexities such as multi-jurisdictional breaches. He 
was particularly emphatic on the importance of recognising when, as a group, they were out 
of their depth and so should seek external support.  
 
P2 and P4, on the other hand, indicated that they would draw on internal expertise such as 
their public relations and legal departments. This difference in approach could be attributable 
to the sector of their organisations. Another possibility is that these other areas do make use 
of external consultants in similar situations, but P2 and P4 are not aware of this due to an IT 
remit. We should also generally note the influence of an organisation’s size as larger 
enterprise are able to maintain specialist functions due to economies of scale. That 
notwithstanding, this point seems to represent an additional area for consideration for 
inclusion in the framework. 
 
The difficulties in assessing the size of data breaches were also discussed by some 
participants. P2 described the variation in the number of impacted customers typical of a data 
breach escalation.  
“We always start off, or we seem to start off with a view from the monitoring that 
500,000 customers have been hacked and then you let that play out. Then as you 
further analyse what’s going on and you’ve really got into it, you end up with 50.” 
Whereas P13 believed that often the exact scope of a compromise may never be known. 
These views were supported by P11 who highlighted the scarcity of information available 
during a cyber crisis and challenged the precept within the framework that it was better to 
over rather than under-report on the size of a breach. Although this stance was softened 
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following discussion and P11 was the only interviewee to directly raise this point, the advice 
to over-report, on reflection, appears too strong. A softer position, counselling organisations 
to avoid underestimating, is therefore used in the revised framework.   
 
Considering this wide range of feedback from interviewees presented above and in our more 
complete analysis, we reflected on and refined our framework. The updated version is 
depicted in Figure 6. This revision also incorporates the fact that interviewees seemed 
distracted by the fact that the framework initially consisted of separate images. We therefore 
now have combined these into one, coherent framework. This, we believe, will be more 
accessible to practitioners.  
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Figure 6. Refined Framework 
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In general, we can see that many of the previous components are maintained but a number 
of minor changes have been made to the visual. These are intended to further support 
organisations and provide a platform for appropriate corporate communications following a 
significant cyber security data breach. Such a framework could be aligned with wider business 
continuity approaches and those targeted at security incident management and response 
within an organisation. 
 
 
8. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
This paper has examined the topical issue of cyber crisis communication, with the intention 
of improving the understanding of what constitutes effective external communication 
following data breaches. Furthermore, we have proposed, validated and refined a novel 
framework which is able to provide guidance to businesses in preparing for and developing 
appropriate corporate communication responses to such breaches. As such, this work has the 
potential for significant impact in supporting industry and in providing a basis for more 
rigorous discussion in academic practice. Another key emerging area where this work may 
also be useful is in cyber insurance activities associated with breaches. Cyber insurance 
providers are increasingly relied upon to support businesses after a breach, with services such 
as public relations and reputation management (Nurse et al., 2020). Our framework could 
provide a robust and validated structure for such corporate communications plans, which is 
accessible and can be refined according to each business’ context and incident management 
strategy.  
 
There are some limitations of our work which should be noted. Qualitative data gathering and 
analysis techniques (e.g., sampling, interviews and thematic analysis), albeit mainstream, can 
introduce some subjectivity into research studies. We have sought to mitigate this through a 
rigorous application of these approaches. For instance, in the selection of interviewees, we 
primarily engaged with senior experts unknown to the researchers to avoid receiving 
favourable responses due to pre-existing relationships. Moreover, to avoid bias in theme 
definition, in cases of disagreement assessors discussed and coalesced on appropriate 
themes. Secondly, this research has been conducted against UK-centric case studies and 
interviews held with UK-based executives and senior managers. Whilst the systematic 
literature review references articles produced by authors resident in a number of countries, 
because of the significant UK emphasis of this work, further investigation would be required 
to investigate whether this research is directly applicable to data breaches outside of the UK. 
Work could, however, be undertaken to extend this research to include case studies from 
other regions, which may provide insight into whether these findings are transferable or any 
adaptations that need to be made. A third limitation pertains to the use of commentary of a 
select set of individuals to determine what is effective communication. There may, for 
instance, be other individuals suitably qualified who hold different valid opinions. We 
attempted to balance this issue by using well-regarded sources, and our approach of 
triangulation where we rely on a variety of sources to inform our framework.  
 
For future work we plan to trial, and potentially pilot, the framework within a company with 
the aim of both integrating it into existing processes and understanding its effectiveness 
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through its application in scenario-based rehearsals. This would provide a crucial practical 
assessment of its effectiveness and allow examination for any areas of further improvement. 
We also intend to reflect on the framework and understand the extent to which it is suitable 
to cater to unintentional data breaches. As mentioned earlier, the framework’s guidance does 
appear to be largely applicable but this will need to be validated, and if necessary, the 
framework adapted. These efforts can also take advantage of our planned trial and pilot. The 
framework generally stands to be of great value as it can allow business, cyber security and 
public relations professionals to plan for and react effectively to major data breaches to avoid 
their cyber crisis turning into a reputational disaster.  
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